The bitter truth about sugar and willpower:The limited evidential value of the glucose model of ego depletion. by Vadillo, Miguel A. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/0956797616654911
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Vadillo Nistal, M. A., Gold, N. K., & Osman, M. (2016). The bitter truth about sugar and willpower: The limited
evidential value of the glucose model of ego depletion.Psychological Science, 27(9), 1207-1214.
10.1177/0956797616654911
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
 
 
 
 
Manuscript ID: PSCI-15-1916-R4 
    
 
IN PRESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
(May 2016) 
 
 
 
Title: The bitter truth about sugar and willpower: The limited evidential value of the glucose 
model of ego depletion 
  
Authors: Miguel Vadillo1, Natalie Gold 2, Magda Osman3 
 
Affiliations: 
1 King’s College London, Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, Guy’s Campus, London SE1 1UL, 
UK 
2 King’s College London, Department of Philosophy, Philosophy Building, London WC2R2LS, UK 
3 Queen Mary University of London, Biological and Experimental Psychology, School of Biological and 
Chemical Sciences, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK 
 
Correspondence author: Magda Osman 
 
Keywords: Ego depletion, Glucose, Meta-analysis, P-curve, Self-control 
 
Word count (Introduction + Discussion + Author Note): 920 + 846 + 81
The glucose model of ego depletion| 1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ego depletion is the idea that willpower draws on a limited mental resource, so that engaging in an 
act of self-control impairs self-control in subsequent tasks. To present ego-depletion as more than a 
convenient metaphor, Gailliot et al. (2007) have proposed that glucose is the limited resource that 
becomes depleted with self-control. However, there have been theoretical challenges to the glucose 
mechanism and the experiments that test it have found mixed results. We use a new meta-analytic 
tool, p-curve, to examine the reliability of the evidence from these experiments. We find that the 
effect sizes reported in this literature are possibly influenced by publication or reporting bias and 
that, even within studies yielding significant results, the evidential value of this research is weak. In 
light of these results, and pending further evidence, researchers and policy makers should refrain 
from drawing any conclusions about the role of glucose in self-control.  
 
(Word count: 149) 
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According to the law of conservation of energy, the total amount of energy of an isolated system can 
never increase. In the domain of psychology, the idea that energy is a limited resource originated 
with Freud (1933/1961). Energy models have been little used in psychology since Freud, though, 
with the rare exception of the ego depletion model developed by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, 
and Tice (1998). According to this research, “the self's acts of volition draw on some limited 
resource, akin to strength or energy and that, therefore, one act of volition will have a detrimental 
impact on subsequent volition” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1252). The implications of research on 
ego depletion are considerable. It has been claimed that reliably exerting self-control, both in terms 
of actively doing something good and avoiding the temptation to act on bad impulses, can greatly 
reduce many of the major ills that effect our society and our personal lives, such as “crime, violence 
unwanted pregnancy, drug addiction, venereal diseases, bankruptcy, and premature deaths” 
(Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000, pp. 130). Not surprisingly, the work of Baumeister et al. (1998) 
has impacted a number of disciplines, including advertising, behavioral economics, business, 
consumerism, law, management, marketing, and medicine. In fact, it is fair to say that the seminal 
paper by Baumeister et al. (1998) has become a classic, with more than 1,250 citations in the Web of 
Science at the time of writing the present article. 
When ego depletion was first proposed, the idea of a limited resource was a convenient 
metaphor.  Given how fundamental exerting self-control is thought to be, it is important to establish 
the energy source that is depleted and to provide a mechanism by which ego depletion occurs. The 
most popular candidate that we find in the literature involves glucose. Gailliot et al. (2007) 
presented nine studies supporting three main findings: (1) Blood glucose levels are reduced after 
performing a self-control task but not after performing a comparative cognitive task that does not 
require self-control; (2) low levels of blood glucose after a first self-control task predict behavioral 
deficits on a second self-control task; and (3) participants whose glucose levels are restored after a 
self-control task, by ingesting a glucose drink, perform better on a subsequent task than participants 
who are given a diet drink in between. They concluded that self-control depletes blood glucose 
leading to decreased self-control on subsequent tasks, and restoring glucose levels replenishes the 
ability to exert self-control.  
While Gailliot et al.’s (2007) conclusions have been extraordinarily influential, their glucose 
hypothesis remains controversial. The mechanism they propose has been challenged and the 
reliability of their results has been disputed. Kurzban (2010) argues that the glucose mechanism as 
presented by Gailliot et al. (2007) is biologically implausible. The mechanism invokes the idea that 
self-control tasks deplete glucose because of energy consumption by the brain, but the supporting 
evidence only shows changes in blood glucose levels. Kurzban cites evidence that the sort of self-
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control tasks used in the literature have little effect on brain metabolism and that changes in blood 
glucose are unlikely to reflect blood glucose uptake by the brain.   
There are also concerns about the empirical evidence for the glucose mechanism. For 
instance, Schimmack (2012) showed that the number of significant results reported by Gailliot et al. 
(2007) is too large, given their average power. In other words, these results are likely to be 
influenced by publication bias and/or p-hacking (see Francis, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011). His concerns are supported by a reanalysis of Gailliot et al.’s data, which finds that self-
control does not decrease blood glucose levels (Kurzban, 2010), and by recent failures to replicate 
the effect of glucose on self-control (Job et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lange 
et al., 2014).  
Generally there are three broad categories of studies that examine the effect of glucose on 
self-control: “correlational studies”, and two types of intervention studies, “glucose ingestion” and 
“glucose rinsing”. Correlational studies measure before/after effects on blood glucose levels when 
self-control is exerted (Dvorak & Simons, 2009; Galliot, 2012; Gailliot et al., 2007; Molden et al., 
2012). Glucose ingestion studies manipulate blood glucose levels, leaving enough time between 
ingestion and the control task for glucose to be absorbed into the blood stream (Birnie et al., 2015; 
Denson et al., 2010; DeWall et al., 2008; Dickinson et al., 2014; Gailliot et al., 2007; Gailliot et al., 
2009; Howard & Marczinski, 2010; Job et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lange et 
al., 2014; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008; Wang & Dvorak, 2010). While the findings provide mixed 
support for the glucose hypothesis, the methods used imply a mechanism that is consistent with 
Gailliot et al.’s proposals. A third set of studies (“glucose-rinsing studies”) examine the impact of 
simply rinsing one’s mouth with glucose prior to exerting self-control (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013; 
Lange & Eggert, 2014; Molden et al., 2012; Sanders et al. 2012). These studies suggest that the signal 
of glucose from the mouth to the brain is sufficient to neutralize the ego-depletion effect. This 
mechanism is consistent with the results of the ingestion manipulations, but it suggests that the 
effect does not depend on a metabolic explanation.  
To help settle the growing concerns in the academic community regarding the reliability of 
the glucose mechanism, which in turn has implications for the ego-depletion hypothesis that it 
underpins, we sought to use a new meta-analytic tool, p-curve, to investigate the presence of 
publication and reporting biases in this literature. 
 
Method 
Literature search strategy 
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We looked for studies supporting the idea that sugar consumption is related to ego-depletion and 
self-regulation. Specifically, we took into account any study exploring the hypothesis that glucose 
ingestion or rinsing improves performance in a laboratory task demanding self-regulation (e.g., 
overcoming an impulse, inhibiting an aggressive reaction, or controlling a cognitive process) or 
ameliorates the effect of an ego-depleting experience on these laboratory self-regulation tasks. We 
also included studies testing whether performance in laboratory tasks is correlated with pre- or 
post-testing sugar levels, again, specifically concerning tasks that explicitly require self-regulation. 
Studies in which participants were not asked to drink sugar, but simply to rinse their mouths with 
sugar, were also included in the present analyses, because this literature also supports the idea that 
sugar consumption improves self-regulation (even if it questions the specific hypothesis that this is 
achieved through metabolic processes). 
Given these criteria, we excluded experiments showing a relation between sugar 
consumption and cognitive processes that, prima facie, do not seem to pose demands on self-
regulation like, for instance, short-term memory or general cognition function (e.g., Carter & 
McCullough, 2013; Owen, Scholey, Finnegan, Hu, & Sünram-Lea, 2012). In addition, based on the 
conditions we set, studies were also excluded that investigated the correlation between general 
glucose levels (or regular glucose ingestion) and self-regulated behavior across many days in 
naturalistic settings. This includes, for instance, studies on the relationship between glucose 
ingestion and smoking cessation or diabetes and different psychological processes (see Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007). These studies rely on measures that differ substantially from the dependent 
variables gathered in laboratory-based ego-depletion tasks and the lack of experimental control 
makes the results amenable to alternative explanations that bear little or no relation to ego 
depletion and self-regulation. 
We began our search by inspecting a small set of studies that had included an exhaustive 
literature review. These included Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis on the general ego-depletion 
literature, a study by Job et al. (2013) exploring inter-individual differences in the impact of glucose 
on self-control, and Lange and Eggert’s (2014) recent attempt to replicate the effect of sugar 
consumption or rinsing on ego-depletion. To make sure that we included all relevant studies, we 
then conducted a systematic search in the Web of Science and Google Scholar for the term “glucose” 
and “ego depletion” or “self-control” or “self-regulation”. This allowed us to detect 18 articles with 
one or more eligible studies. All these studies are listed in Table 1 and are also marked with asterisks 
in the reference list. Furthermore, we found out that one of our selected studies (Masicampo & 
Baumeister, 2008) had been included in the famous project on the reproducibility of psychological 
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science (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This replication was also included in our analyses 
yielding a total of 19 articles. 
 
P-curve 
Our assessment of the reliability of this set of studies was based on p-curve (Simonsohn, Nelson, & 
Simmons, 2014), a recently designed meta-analytic tool that explores various biases in the published 
literature using only the distribution of significant p-values. Imagine that a set of studies is exploring 
an effect that does not exist. Occasionally, these studies will observe a significant result just by 
chance (i.e., a p-value lower than .05). In this scenario, all p-values will be equally likely: 5% of 
studies will have p-values lower than .05, 4% of studies will have p-values lower than .04, and so on. 
Consequently, the p-values of a set of studies exploring a non-existent effect should typically follow 
a flat distribution. Interestingly, this is not the case if the studies are exploring true effects. In this 
case, significant p-values should follow a right-skewed distribution, where small p-values (e.g., p < 
.01) should be more prevalent than larger p-values (e.g., .04 < p < .05). As explained by Simonsohn et 
al. (2014), this can be easily understood if one imagines an experimenter exploring a very large 
effect with a large sample of participants. Most likely, he/she will observe a very low p-value. 
Experiments with smaller effect sizes and smaller samples are simply less extreme versions of this 
ideal scenario. Even for low powered studies, the distribution of p-values should be right skewed. 
This implies that, in principle, one can know whether a set of experiments is exploring true effects or 
null effects simply by checking whether their p-values follows a right-skewed distribution or a rather 
flat distribution. An interesting feature of this approach is that it focuses exclusively on significant p-
values (i.e., studies where p < .05) and, consequently, its results are unaffected by publication bias. 
An online application designed by Simonsohn et al. (available at http://www.p-curve.com) 
allows researchers to test whether an observed distribution of p-values is significantly right-skewed 
or, alternatively, whether the distribution of p-values is suspiciously flat, which could suggest that 
the significant results are false positives. A simple way to test whether the distribution of p-values is 
significantly right-skewed is to compare the number of significant p-values lower than .025 with the 
number of p-values between .025 and .05 using a binomial test. A potential shortcoming of this 
approach is that this binomial test gives the same weight to exceptionally small p-values (e.g., 
.00001) as to p-values barely smaller than .025 (e.g., .024). To overcome this limitation, the latest 
versions of p-curve not only conduct a binomial test, but also an alternative analysis, known as 
continuous test, that is sensitive to the exact p-values. 
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If the distribution of p-values is not significantly right-skewed, this might mean that the 
studies lack any ‘evidential value’ or, in other words, that the significant results can be false 
positives. However, failure to find a significant right-skewed distribution might also be due to the 
lack of statistical power (e.g., if a very small number of studies is included in the analysis). As a 
means to test whether the distribution of p-values is too flat, Simonsohn et al. (2014) suggested 
testing whether the p-curve is flatter than the theoretical distribution that one would observe in a 
set of studies with 33% statistical power. If the p-curve is significantly flatter than this very flat 
standard, a common conclusion is that the set of studies might lack evidential value and that they 
might be the product of publication bias, selective reporting, or p-hacking. 
 
Selection of statistical contrasts 
We selected the key statistical contrasts of each study following the guidelines offered by 
Simonsohn et al. (2014). In the case of correlational studies or experiments with just two groups, we  
registered the target correlation coefficient, the statistic testing the regression slope, or the statistic 
testing the difference of means. In complex factorial designs, if researchers expected to find an ego-
depletion effect disappearing in a specific condition, then we registered the statistic testing the 
interaction. In contrast, if they were expecting to find a complete cross-over interaction, we 
registered the two simple effects. A total of 38 statistical contrasts were included in the analyses. 
Following the recommendations of Simonsohn et al. (2014), when two statistics were equally valid, 
we used one of them in the main analysis and the other one in a robustness test. In most cases (4/5), 
we adopted the general rule of selecting the first one appearing in the text for the main analysis and 
the second one for the robustness test. However, in one occasion (Birnie et al., 2015) we broke this 
rule because the conclusions of the authors relied more heavily on one of the statistics. In this 
particular case, we selected this specific statistic for the main analysis and the other one for the 
robustness test. We did not find any study where three or more statistics were equally valid for the 
p-curve analysis. A p-curve disclosure table with all the selected statistics and the justification for our 
choice is available at http://bit.ly/1PoHFby. 
 
Results 
The list of studies, together with the key statistical contrasts of each study, are shown in Table 1. 
Figure 1 plots the frequencies of each range of p-values among the studies included in the present 
analysis. As can be seen, the main p-curve does not fit with the right-skewed distribution that one 
would expect if these studies were exploring a true effect. The only ‘positive’ feature of the 
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distribution is that there are no significant results immediately below .05. However, p-values in the 
[0, .04] interval show, if anything, a left-skewed distribution. Not surprisingly, the statistical contrast 
testing the right-skewness of the p-curve was non-significant, (p = .575 for the binomial test 
comparing the proportion of p < .025 and .025 < p < .05, and z = -0.83, p = .204 for the continuous 
test). Furthermore, the observed distribution is flatter than would be expected if the studies were 
simply underpowered. Statistical analyses confirmed that the p-curve was significantly flatter than a 
null of 33% power (binomial p = .019; continuous test: z = -2.08, p = .019). The results were very 
similar for the robustness test, which also failed to find significant evidence of right-skewness (p = 
.500 for the binomial test, and z = -0.88, p = .190 for the continuous test) and, in fact, detected that 
the p-curve was significantly flatter than a 33%-powered p-curve, (p = .033 for the binomial test and 
z = -1.99, p = .023 for the continuous test). 
 
 
Figure 1. P-curve of the key statistical contrasts included in the analysis compared to the 
expected distribution when the null hypothesis is true (null of zero effect) or when the 
alternative hypothesis is true but the experiments lack sufficient power (null of 33% power). 
 
It is interesting to note that the results of p-curve do not improve if one removes from the 
analyses all the studies that explored the effects of glucose rinsing, which are based on a somewhat 
different theoretical background. Neither the continuous test (z = -0.57, p = .285) nor the binomial 
test (p = .668) suggested that the remaining set of studies had any evidential value after removing 
glucose rinsing experiments. Furthermore, both tests (continuous z = -1.94, p = .026; binomial p = 
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.024) suggested that the p-curve was significantly flatter than a null of 33% power. In other words, 
the poor results of the previous tests cannot be attributed to the inclusion of glucose rinsing studies 
in the analyses. 
 
Discussion 
The results of our analyses suggest that the relationship between glucose levels and self-control 
behaviors might be unreliable. Figure 1 shows that the key p-values of the 19 studies included in the 
present analyses follow a surprisingly flat distribution. This is exactly the pattern of results that one 
would expect to find if those results were false positives. These results remain unchanged regardless 
of whether glucose rinsing studies are included or excluded from the sample. 
These results may not come as a complete surprise given the challenges the glucose 
hypothesis has come up against empirically through failed replications (Job et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 
2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lange et al., 2014) and theoretical critiques regarding its biological 
plausibility (Kurzban, 2010; Osman, 2014). Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the seminal paper 
suggesting the glucose hypothesis showed that the number of significant findings reported in that 
paper was too large, given the low power of each study (Schimmack, 2012). In other words, the 
results were “too good to be true” (Francis, 2012). Nevertheless, the findings from the present study 
are a surprise in the context of the wide acceptance of the glucose hypothesis in general scientific 
research and its popularity, as evidenced by the number of citations that the original work by Gailliot 
et al (2007) has received and the continued influence of this hypothesis in recent reviews on ego 
depletion (e.g., Baumeister, 2014; Baumeister & Alghamdi, in press). Moreover, the hypothesis has 
intuitive and seemingly practical appeal. If one accepts that the many personal and societal 
problems we face come down to failing to regulate our actions by not exerting enough self-control 
(Baumeister et al. 2000), then glucose supplements would provide a simple means to enhance our 
will power and ameliorate these problems (Baumeister & Tierny, 2011). In light of our results, it is 
dubious that such a recommendation will work in the real world. This conclusion converges with 
recent evidence that glucose might have little or no impact on domain general decision-making tasks 
(Orquin & Kurzban, in press) and an intriguing series of meta-analyses and pre-registered 
replications suggesting that the ego-depletion effect itself might be less robust than previously 
thought (Carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015; Hagger et al., in press). 
Previous criticisms of the glucose model of ego-depletion have typically focused on 
individual papers (e.g., Kurzban, 2010; Schimmack, 2012). Article-level analyses like those of Francis 
(2012) are ideal in some respects because they ensure that all the studies under scrutiny are 
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grounded in the same theoretical view and rely on very similar research methods. Unfortunately, 
only a couple of the papers included in the present review contain a sufficiently large number of 
studies to attempt this type of analysis (Gailliot et al., 2007, and possibly Hagger & Chatzinsarantis, 
2013). An examination of the wider literature, like the one offered in the present article, must 
necessarily collate studies with heterogeneous methods and theoretical backgrounds. In exchange, 
this approach allows researchers to check for publication and reporting biases in areas of research 
where articles with a small number of studies are prevalent. In this sense, our study adds to the 
conclusions of article-level analyses by suggesting that the kind of biases that have been detected in 
isolated studies might be representative of the wider area of research on the glucose model of ego-
depletion. In any case, it is also important to note that, with the possible exception of glucose rinsing 
studies, the rest of the experiments included in the present analyses share a common theoretical 
background. 
It is worth noting that, as with any other statistical test, p-curve is not a flawless indicator of 
bias (Bishop & Thompson, 2016; Bruns & Ioannidis, 2016; Lakens, 2015). Our results suggest that, on 
average, these studies have little or no evidential value, but they do not allow us to determine 
whether the significant results are due to publication bias, selective reporting of outcomes/analysis, 
and/or p-hacking. It is not impossible that some of these studies are exploring small but true effects, 
and that their evidential value may be diluted by the biases that pervade the rest of the studies. 
Perhaps future research will show that glucose does play a role in ego-depletion effects, but our 
conclusions are based on the analysis of the extant literature in this area. Thus, our contribution 
must be seen as an additional piece of information in the wider context of attempts to verify the 
reliability of the glucose model of ego-depletion. It is also important to remark that the kind of 
biases explored in the present study are prevalent in other (but not all) areas of psychological 
research (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012) and that low reproducibility is not exclusively a 
problem of psychological research (Camerer et al., 2016; Errington, Iorns, Gunn, Tan, Lomax, & 
Nosek, 2014). In fact, it is fair to say that psychology is taking a leading role in the dissemination of 
open research practices (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). We hope that this new trend in 
psychological research will soon render meta-analytic studies like the present one unnecessary. 
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Table 1. List of studies and statistical contrasts included in the analyses 
Paper Study # Sugar rinsing? 
Key statistical 
contrast 
p-value 
Birnie, Smallwood, Reay, & 
Riby (2015) 
 No t(15)=2.469* 
.02605 
Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & 
Teo (2010) 
1 No t(67)=-2.19 .03201 
 2 No t(151)=2.24 .02655 
DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & 
Maner (2008) 
2 No F(1, 55) = 6.64 
.01268 
Dickinson, McElroy, & Stroh 
(2014) 
 No z = 1.88 
.06011 
Dvorak & Simons (2009)  No F(1, 177) = 5.63 
.01873 
Gailliot (2012)  No r(50) = -.30 
.03071 
Gailliot, Baumeister, DeWall, 
Maner, Plant, Tice, Brewer, & 
Schmeichel (2007) 
1 No F(1, 100) = 6.08 
.01537 
 2 No t(33) = 2.20 
.03492 
 3 No r(14) = -.62* 
.01041 
 4 No r(10) = .56 .05828 
 5 No r(21) = .45 
.03120 
 6 No r(15) = .43 
.08493 
 7 No F(1, 57) = 5.04 
.02866 
 8 No F(1, 69) = 5.45 
.02249 
 9 No t(16) = 3.13 
.00646 
Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, & 
Baumeister (2009) 
 No t(47) = 2.21* 
.03201 
Hagger & Chatzinsarantis 
(2013) 
1 Yes F(1, 24) = 8.42 
.00783 
 2 Yes F(1, 30) = 6.12 
.01925 
 3 Yes F(1, 32) = 4.06 
.05238 
 4 Yes F(1, 40) = 10.32 
.00260 
 5 Yes F(1, 36) = 7.28 
.01055 
Howard & Marczinski (2010)  No F(4, 75) = 2.95 
.02544 
Job, Walton, Bernecker, & 
Dweck (2013) 
1 No t(78) = 2.10 
.03896 
 2 No F(1,58) = 5.16 
.02684 
 3 No F(1,139) = 5.28 
.02306 
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Kelly, Sünram-Lea, & Crawford 
(2015) 
 No F(1, 67) = 0.80 
.37430 
Lange & Eggert (2014) 1 No F(1,68) = 1.12 
.29366 
 2 No F(1,110) = 0.01* 
.92053 
Lange, Seer, Rapior, Rose, & 
Eggert (2014) 
 No t(68) = 0.05* 
.96027 
Masicampo & Baumeister 
(2008) 
 No F(1, 111) = 5.311 
.02305 
Molden, Hui, Scholer, Meier, 
Noreen, D'Agostino, & Martin 
(2012) 
1 No F(1, 83) = 2.05 
.15596 
 2 Yes F(1, 39) = 4.54 
.03947 
 3 Yes F(1, 28) = 5.02 
.03317 
Open Science Collaboration 
(2015). Replication of 
Masicampo & Baumeister 
(2008) 
 No F(1,158) = 0.379 
.53902 
Sanders, Shirk, Burgin, & 
Martin (2012) 
 Yes t(49) = -2.129 
.03831 
Wang & Dvorak (2010)  No t(31) = 2.55 
.01593 
  No t(32) = 3.12 .00381 
Note. The statistical contrasts were selected following the guidelines of Simonsohn et al. (2014). A complete 
p-curve disclosure table justifying the selection of each statistical contrast is available at the Open Science 
Framework http://bit.ly/1PoHFby. The statistical contrasts marked with asterisks were replaced by 
alternative contrasts in the robustness test (see the online p-curve disclosure table for further details). 
 
